There are a variety of approaches to how devices are identified, and also how devices are certified in services. Ultimately the mechanisms your organization employs must operate from a more top level strategy and approach.
The IoT strategy revolves around two central factors. It would be rare for an organization to implement an IoT product only for technology, so first and foremost, organizations need to articulate high-level ideas about how, where and why they generate their new values Want to take advantage of IoT concepts to do business. The answers to these questions will then drive the product capabilities, connectivity and integration required to achieve the strategic vision. Another important factor analysis is needed, but unfortunately often addressed very late in the development cycle, is risk assessment and selection of risk mitigation technologies in IoT solutions.
This risk profile helps to see all possible threats to security, privacy, fraud and other potentially negative areas. The risk magnitude or concern associated with each sector depends to a large extent on factors including, but not limited to, the company’s general risk range, industry of operation, and legislative constraints. When IoT peels back the ecosystem profile, there are several common areas that organizations will need to relate to in order to appropriately mitigate the risks associated with their IoT solutions.
Define and assess risk and attack areas
First, consider a sample of potential risks / attack vectors against the IoT ecosystem. Many of IoT’s attacks include traditional cyber attacks such as Mirrors: Thing in the Middle, Daniels of Sleep, Eavesdropping or Snooping, or a replay attack. The impact of each of these attacks will vary greatly depending on the details of the ecosystem and equipment environment, as well as the aforementioned business risk concerns. However, we can generalize a little to dive into the details and mitigation of some of these.
If we take the Thing into the middle concept, we can envision a scenario where a malicious party might want risk – security fake temperature data from a monitoring device in order to cause physical and financial harm to the operating organization of the machinery. A piece can be forced. There are several technical components that can be employed to reduce this risk.
Ultimately, what we are seeing is how does the service rely on data sent from the device?
Trust is a very interesting concept in these IoT ecosystems, as it not only relies on the definition of the term, but also needs the assurance of the trusting parties, as well as the technical competence of the end points in the ecosystem. A main theme related to belief is the concept of identity. So, how can a device receive service from sensor data and make decisions, both convincing that the data it is sending is also receiving itself? The first service needs to establish trust with the source of the data – this is authentication, and the second is the need to ensure that the data is not modified as it was sent over the network – it is integrity.
Strong Identification and Authentication Mechanism
Within this framework, I will speak for the implementation of PKI’s ‘best practice’ and compare it to a more traditional device name / password scenario, which demonstrates how to build a higher assurance model, which is more risk reduction And reduces the likelihood of falls. Hunting for one thing in the middle attack, addressing some of the questions raised above.
One of the benefits of PKI in terms of our device is that it can be implemented without reliable service without knowing any part of the device’s secret. The PKI relies on two parts, a public key – often bound to an identity certificate – that can be exposed publicly, and the private key, which, simply, must remain private.
In a device environment, it is best practice here to take advantage of secure hardware such as reliable platform modules or equivalents, for the creation and storage of private keys. These hardware containers provide very strong assurance that there are no private keys and will not be exposed. By starting these secure hardware components with secure keys, you have a large base for creating trusted identities.
Taking advantage of the assurance of key storage, in a certificate based on PKI deployment
, you may want to issue a digital certificate that binds some idea of the identity information for the public key to correspond to the private key. This process is often done with equipment on the manufacturing line. This digital certificate can be used in a wide range of scenarios, to authenticate the device securely, and without the privacy of Bootstrap Communications privacy negotiation with the privacy of private services. Compared to this approach to a standard username and password, there are several points where assurance starts to degrade. The generation of the username and password must be somewhere.